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Abstract: Reflections on the progress of the WTO over the last two decades highlights low 
developing country participation in its dispute settlement system as a fundamental failing of 
the multinational trading system. Recurrently, this low participation rate has been attributed to 
the cost of the WTO’s legalistic model in Panel and Appellate Body proceedings, creating a 
concern of bias. Yet, by focussing on the inherent costs of the system, critics ignore the real 
ways in which developing countries can and have used the WTO dispute settlement system to 
offset the costs. Therefore, this article argues that developing countries are more disadvantaged 
in their lack of internal capacity to identify and progress legitimate violations to the WTO. 
Only by addressing the capacity issue can an accurate cost and benefit analysis of the WTO 
dispute settlement system take place.  
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The World Trade Organization’s (WTO) dispute settlement system celebrates its 20th 
anniversary this year as ‘the central pillar of the multilateral trading system’.1 One of the main 
areas of reform with which the dispute settlement system came into existence was: 
‘Recognizing further that there is need for positive efforts designed to ensure that developing 
countries and especially the least developed among them, secure a share in the growth in 
international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development.’2 Although 
much has been debated of its early success and failures, the two decades since its 
implementation has seen the changes in patterns of trade and global growth remain largely un-
reflected in the use of the dispute settlement system by developing countries. Despite this, 
recent calls for reform of the system have been quiet and the seemingly everlasting Doha Round 
reveals a complacency and lack of political will at the top. This paper hopes to recapture the 
original debate on the position of developing countries within the dispute settlement system 
and, at a minimum, show that notwithstanding the current complacency of its members the 
dispute settlement system does have much cause to celebrate. 
It is argued here that the dispute settlement system has been successful in sustaining a 
rule of law that has been proven to benefit developing countries. The ‘legalistic’ approach of 
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the dispute settlement system provides developing countries with an independent recourse to 
remedies for inconsistent trade barriers. Although often stated to have come at the expense of 
developing countries’ ability to participate in the system, it is argued here that the success of 
the dispute settlement system should not be diminished by the inherent costs. Developing 
countries must acknowledge that they risk greater long term damage to trade terms by not 
participating in the dispute settlement system, compared with the initial costs of participation. 
The importance of the dispute settlement system lies in the fact that this is where members 
‘play for the rules’, shaping interpretation of trade agreements.3 Therefore developing countries 
cannot afford to remain outside of the process. The trends in developing country participation 
show that those countries that use the WTO dispute settlement system have done so in ways 
that successfully offset some of its costs (through their use as a third party, consultations and 
ACWL.) The fact that smaller countries habitually do not participate shows that the problem is 
not in the framework of the dispute settlement system, but with developing members 
identifying when it is worth using it. As a self-representative system, developing countries must 
be willing to invest and make use of the options that the WTO does provide. As lack of 
participation is largely a problem of capacity rather than cost, reform must come mainly from 
within developing members with a focus on awareness and government engagement with the 
private sector. This paper suggests ways in which this reform can take place. 
 
B. THE IMPORTANCE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRY PARTICIPATION IN 
THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM  
The purpose of the WTO dispute settlement system is to solve trade disputes between WTO 
members to ensure the smooth flow of trade based on WTO principles.4 Thus the WTO dispute 
settlement system relies on active engagement by all members in order to create a judicial 
system which ultimately provides ‘a level playing field’ for litigants based on the rule of law. 
In order to promote participation by all members, it is important to make members aware of its 
benefits. Shaffer accurately highlights three primary reasons why active participation is 
imperative. Firstly, ‘the specific economic outcome of WTO disputes5 makes engagement with 
WTO proceedings important. As the most apparent reason for the initiation of WTO 
proceedings these specific outcomes are likely to be part of a cost-benefit analysis driving 
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members’ decision-making. On the whole, countries can calculate in monetary terms the 
prospective gains of lifted trade barriers and therefore the prospective benefits of filing WTO 
proceedings. Following from this is that ‘failure to participate in the WTO dispute settlement 
system can have term of trade effects that adversely affect the overall social welfare of the 
country’.6 Although these may be harder to calculate than the specific economic outcomes, 
term of trade effects in relation to a country’s market access and trade relationships must also 
be taken into consideration when weighing the cost of initiating WTO proceedings. 
More importantly, often overlooked by WTO members is the effect that each dispute 
has on interpretation and application of WTO jurisprudence.7 Beyond the specific stakes of 
WTO disputes are the long-term consequences that participation has on future bargaining 
positions.8 Through participation with the system, countries are able to voice their opinions on 
specific aspects of WTO law, contributing to the shaping and interpretation of WTO 
agreements. When countries systematically fail to participate in the dispute settlement system, 
as most developing countries have, they risk losing this platform to further individual trade 
aims within the WTO. The essential point is that members taking part in the dispute settlement 
system are not solely arguing for or against specific interpretations of WTO law, but are also 
‘playing for the rules’: how the law should be interpreted and with what purpose. In this respect, 
WTO disputes shape the future bargaining position of members by deciding which trade 
interests must be protected.9 This idea is all the more important as the WTO dispute settlement 
system is still relatively new and thus malleable to the purpose with which its agreements are 
interpreted. As a form of international law the WTO agreements themselves are ‘still largely 
soft law agreements, with ambiguities and gaps in their provisions’. 10  In clarifying these 
ambiguities and filling in the legal gaps there is considerable space for members to influence 
the future direction of trade law. It is for this reason that participation by both developed and 
developing countries is vital. 
Moreover, Mosoti and others propose that participation in the WTO dispute settlement 
system is not only of value to members for progression of their individual aims, but can be 
considered a ‘public good’.11 All members benefit from increased participation in the system 
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as the ‘litigation creates greater clarity of WTO rules’.12 Bown and Hoekman also subscribe to 
this idea as they consider that the dispute settlement system ‘improves property rights – in this 
context market access rights’.13 Participation in the dispute settlement system therefore adds 
certainty to otherwise unclear trade agreements. With greater certainty follows more 
investment and international transactions to the benefit of all trading nations.14 At the same 
time, the ability of the dispute settlement system to act as a ‘public good’ should not be 
confused with the reality that the dispute settlement system requires a strong element of self-
representation. All members have equal opportunity to use the system in furthering their 
interpretation of trade agreements in so far as they are willing and able to articulate their own 
interests. 
This paper goes on to show that all members are able to use the system so long as 
governments are willing to invest in doing so. As individuals, private companies or NGOs have 
no standing to bring violations to the WTO: only governments are able to initiate proceedings. 
Bown has been among the supporters of the view that self-representation can create a bias 
against developing countries. The basis of a self-representation system relies on the concept 
that ‘countries have sufficient resources to both monitor and recognize relevant WTO 
violations and to fund legal proceedings in cases in which their rights have been violated’.15 
Yet as evidence shows, not all developing countries can afford to do so. The increased legalistic 
nature of the dispute settlement system has resulted in a high cost of WTO litigation that 
developed countries are able to absorb more easily then developing countries, which places 
developed countries in an advantageous position. The result of this can be seen in the disparities 
in participation rates among developed and developing countries. Hence it is suggested that the 
WTO dispute settlement system is institutionally biased,16 pricing developing countries out of 
their ability to participate within the system. 
However, such criticism of the WTO dispute settlement system misunderstands the 
conceptual foundations on which it works. The self-representation element of the dispute 
settlement system is not biased against developing countries, but instead builds a legitimate 
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judicial system based on the rule of law. The Panel and Appellate Body process within the 
WTO dispute settlement system focusses on an adversarial model requiring proactive initiation 
of proceedings and direct engagement. As will be discussed further in this paper, despite 
perceived access issues this litigation model creates ‘a level playing field’ for complainants 
and respondents, as the court of law gives parties equal bargaining positions from which to 
state their legal arguments. In this manner the WTO dispute settlement system encompasses 
the notion of ‘right before might’.17 Developing countries therefore have most to gain from 
such a judicial system where the strength of legal argument rather than leverage is the 
determining factor for Panel and Appellate Body decisions. Related to this is the inevitability 
of costs in order to maintain the legitimacy of the system. In any case, as in all judicial systems 
limitation in time and resources within the WTO dispute settlement system means that the 
system would risk being over burdened by cases if there were no cost of participation. 
Consequently the inherent costs make the system viable: ‘[i]f there were no implicit “user fees”, 
the dispute settlement system would implode. It has to cost something to keep out nuisance 
cases of insignificant value’.18 Hence developing countries must recognise that although the 
dispute settlement system is costly, these costs must be borne in order to ensure its legitimacy. 
Furthermore, the requirement of self-representation and self-initiation of WTO dispute 
settlement proceedings is in keeping with the fact that the WTO is not a supranational entity 
but a judicial one. In order for the dispute settlement system to maintain its legitimacy as a 
member-driven organisation, governments must be the driving force in WTO litigation. A self-
representation framework in the dispute settlement system therefore ensures that it is members 
who determine the direction of WTO law as it is members that bring complaints. Moreover, 
the self-initiation of proceedings under the WTO means that governments maintain 
accountability within their countries. When governments are accountable, they must justify to 
industry and exporters their decision to bring or not bring claims to the WTO. The benefit of 
this approach is that it drives more proactive decision-making by member governments forcing 
them to weigh up the costs and benefits in each case. As will be discussed further in a later 
section, this also motivates members to debate important trade policy issues within their 
governments and build greater trade capacity. Consequently this paper argues that in weighing 
up the costs and benefits of participating within the WTO dispute settlement system, 
developing countries need to give due weight to the wider strategic importance of active 
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participation, and as it will go on to argue, embrace the means within the WTO dispute 
settlement system to offset inherent costs.  
 
C. THE PROBLEM OF LOW PARTICIPATION BY DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 
Participation in the dispute settlement system is defined broadly evaluating the trends with 
which the members access and use the system. This discussion therefore looks at the initiation 
of Panel and Appellate Body proceedings by members, as well as how members use the dispute 
system beyond litigation to further their trade interests. In doing so, this paper does not 
overlook developing countries’ participation in other aspects of the WTO, including trade 
negotiation rounds where they can be seen to play a more active role.19 Instead, the paper 
focusses on participation in the dispute settlement system for the practical importance that 
WTO jurisprudence plays in the interpretations and implementation of world trade law. 
The continued accession of new countries into the WTO, the Seychelles being the latest 
to join in April 2015,20 suggests that WTO membership remains strategically important for 
countries in managing global trade relations. Yet, despite its extensive membership of 161 
countries, the majority of WTO members have had minimal participation in the dispute 
settlement system. In particular, the stark difference in participation levels between developed 
and developing countries has been a long recurring criticism of the dispute settlement system. 
Since its establishment in 1995, the EU and US have dominated dispute settlement proceedings 
as respondents or complainants in 80 percent of WTO cases.21 In contrast, developing countries 
have accounted for only 46 percent of all cases.22 Yet even within these figures, trends show 
that only a select few developing countries have participated in WTO disputes on more than 
one occasion. Brazil, Mexico, India and Argentina lead developing country participation in the 
dispute settlement system.23 Abbot argues that as a result the data creates a ‘false picture’24 of 
developing country participation, as the figure is dominated by these select WTO members 
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who ‘are among the most advanced and most active in international trade’. 25  A classic 
illustration of this is Argentina which, in 2006, had been a respondent or complainant in 12 
percent of all cases despite its contribution of world trade accounting for only 0.3 percent.26 
Hence, while large developing countries are over-represented in the system, smaller developing 
countries remain disengaged. 
The problem of a lack of developing country participation is therefore more acute when 
looking at the patterns of participation in smaller developing countries. Whilst there is a general 
habit in the literature on the WTO to group all developing countries into the same category, the 
WTO does distinguish in its agreements those least developed countries (LDCs). LDCs, 
following a UN definition based on low-income, human asset index, and economic 
vulnerability, are those that have the lowest social economic development.27 Although 34 of 
the 48 LDCs are members of the WTO,28 LDC participation in the WTO dispute settlement 
system is virtually non-existent. With the exception of Bangladesh as the only LDC to have 
brought a compliant to the Panel,29 the data shows LDCs to be disconnected with the dispute 
settlement system as a whole. The issue is exacerbated as there is also a geographical divide in 
participation rates. This supports the notion of inherent issues in the accessibility of the WTO 
dispute settlement system. Since 1995, few African countries have initiated Panel proceedings. 
‘With the exception of South Africa and Egypt, which have the most experience with the 
functioning of the process, the rest of the delegations are only tangentially interested in the 
issue.’30 This raises concern about the lack of diversity in the dispute settlement system. 
Notwithstanding the problem in labelling countries as ‘developing’, this paper 
continues to use the term broadly in order to evaluate the participation of the group as a whole 
and identify trends in the way they use the system. Constraints on the information available on 
the internal factors driving small developing country participation in WTO dispute settlement 
system makes a full bottom-up assessment31 difficult. However, from the data available on 
developing country participation, certain assumptions and comparisons can be made to identify 
trends in the group’s use of the system. In doing so, developing countries can be differentiated 
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through their use of the system enabling the identification of some of the individual problems 
facing countries.  
 
D. REASONS FOR LOW PARTICIPATION WITHIN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES: A COST AND CAPACITY DEBATE 
In this paper explanations for low participation among developing countries are broadly 
distinguished into cost and capacity issues.32 Here, cost issues describe the price of using the 
dispute settlement system which can usually be calculated by members in monetary terms. 
These costs are factored into the overall cost-benefit analysis members perform when deciding 
whether to initiate WTO proceedings. In contrast, capacity issues refer largely to internal issues 
within countries that jeopardise the member’s ability to participate fully in the system; they are 
often individual to each member country. Although the two issues are largely interlinked, the 
distinction between the two helps to pinpoint where the problem of low participation lies and 
methods of possible reform. It is true that there are inherent costs in the WTO dispute settlement 
system, yet these are, on balance, successfully offset by provisions within the same system. 
The trends in developing country participation show that the problem principally lies in 
members’ ability to identify viable legal cases to bring to the WTO. The real problem is not 
cost, but one of capacity. 
1. Issues of cost  
As touched on above, cost issues associated with the dispute settlement system are of 
predominant concern to developing countries when attempting to participate in the WTO. The 
increased legalistic nature of the dispute settlement system from its predecessor, the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), has been central to the high-cost of WTO litigation. 
The approach under the old GATT system worked on the basis of a ‘small “club” of like-
minded trade policy officials working together’.33 The 1994 Marrakesh Agreement introduced 
a Dispute Settlement Body and an Appellate Body, resulting in a new judicial system for 
international trade disputes.34 The changes strengthened the legal basis of dispute proceedings 
and created a more structured litigation model than had previously existed. An inherent 
consequence of the more legalistic system has become the increased cost of using the WTO 
dispute settlement system. Due to the greater technical aspects of law that has followed from 
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the litigation model, a certain level of expertise is now required in order for countries to 
participate in proceedings. The cost of hiring experts and trade lawyers in order to manoeuvre 
within the legal structure has resulted in the increased overall cost of participation. 
Similarly, the substantial number of WTO cases each year, contributing to the rising 
total of 497 cases,35 has made understanding and digesting the legal intricacies of WTO law 
costly for members. The reality of the situation is that ‘the jurisprudence of the WTO grows 
with each passing year, making it necessary to read numerous book-length Panel and Appellate 
Body decisions in order to properly understand the legal context.’36 Taking into consideration 
both the cost of lawyers and increased effort in discerning legal arguments from lengthy WTO 
decisions, the cost of WTO litigation has been estimated at $500,000.37 The further risk is that 
‘with uncertainty, if exporters consistently over-estimated the litigation costs and/or under-
estimated the increase in profits associated with market access benefits, this would also 
increase the likelihood that an exporter would choose not to initiate a dispute at the WTO.’38 
Bown and Hoekman submit that the suggested figure is likely to be at the lower end of estimates 
as it includes neither ‘the resources necessary to investigate potential claims in the pre-litigation 
phase, nor the resources necessary to engage public relations and/or political lobbying in the 
post-litigation phase to generate compliance.’39 Hence the knowledge that WTO litigation is 
extremely costly, alongside difficulties in measuring with certainty the exact cost, can lead to 
developing countries choosing not to initiate proceedings even in situations where they have a 
legitimate case. 
Moreover, the resulting disruption to a country’s trade during WTO disputes shows 
additional costs associated with initiation of dispute settlement proceedings. There is little 
comment in the literature as to what happens to trade figures within litigating countries during 
disputes. Nonetheless a logical assumption can be made that trade between the two litigating 
countries will be adversely affected by the ongoing dispute. As follows, lengthy WTO disputes 
can cause wider damage to the economy of the countries involved. As cases in the WTO can 
take up to two years,40 the effect felt is long-lasting. Any further delays in the process can 
therefore weaken the bargaining powers of complainants. Certain structural provisions within 
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the dispute settlement system, such as selection of Panel members and a mandatory 
consultation process prior to initiation of Panel proceedings, can facilitate a respondent’s ability 
to delay at the expense of complainants.41 As developed countries absorb these costs more 
easily then developing countries, developing countries may feel greater pressure to settle 
disputes on unfavourable terms in an attempt to limit loss in trade. 
The problem is exacerbated by the absence of compensation for loss of trade. As 
compensation is not applied retrospectively within the WTO, violating members do not have 
to pay for the loss of trade caused by their breach of WTO articles prior to Panel and Appellate 
Body decisions. In this way lengthy WTO litigation creates additional costs to trade with the 
knowledge that compensation for breaches is unlikely. One proposal for reform is for 
developing countries to receive compensation for the duration of the violating measure.42 This, 
however, has the ability to add to the uncertain costs of WTO litigation for members, causing 
respondents to be in a worse bargaining position. Browne goes on to suggest that ‘such 
compensation should also be paid if the developed country unilaterally withdraws the measure 
before completion of proceedings’.43 Yet if this were the case, it would be likely that developed 
countries would be further motivated to litigate to the end and less willing to settle at an early 
stage. This would be to the cost of developing countries. Alternatively, ‘a Panel might ask the 
respondent to suspend the measure in dispute for a specified period’.44 This is a better method 
to avoid the loss of trade during WTO disputes as it means that attempts to delay proceedings 
will not impede a developing country’s bargaining position. 
More radical reform has been suggested to the legal framework of the WTO dispute 
settlement system in order to reduce its cost to developing countries. China has proposed 
reform to the WTO dispute settlement proceedings by shifting the burden of cost to developed 
countries. In cases where the Appellate Body rules in favour of a developing country it is 
suggested that the developed country should pay for the developing country’s legal costs, thus 
reducing the developing country’s cost of participation.45 Despite mitigating the litigation costs 
for developing countries, such an approach would be imbalanced. As discussed above, the costs 
of WTO dispute settlement system are inherent costs that must be borne by all members to 
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ensure equality under the law. As developing countries benefit from using the system, it is not 
surprising that they must also bear some of its costs. 
Mention should also be made of the proposal that the WTO should put in place a small 
claims procedure.46 Nordström and Shaffer’s principal argument for this is that the WTO 
dispute settlement system in its current form ‘is not neutral to size’. 47  Small developing 
countries and LDCs are constrained in their ability to use the dispute settlement system as their 
low volume of world trade means that the increased market access they would achieve through 
successful litigation would be little relative to the costs.48 In addition to the rudimentary issues 
such as defining ‘small’ claims,49 to have such a separate system alongside the WTO dispute 
settlement system would worsen the problem that such a procedure wishes to address. The idea 
that the WTO dispute settlement system currently lacks legitimacy due to the fact that 
developing members are failing to participate will be exacerbated if small developing countries 
instead use a small claims procedure.50 The principal criticism is ‘that a remedy of monetary 
compensation could create an incentive for developed countries to buy themselves out of their 
WTO obligations through the payment of compensation, rather than complying with them, 
thereby undoing agreed trade concessions’.51 The proposal is therefore based on the assumption 
that financial concerns are the decisive factor for developing countries. However, as previously 
noted, specific financial outcome is not the only reason for participation in the dispute 
settlement system: of equal importance are the wider issues of terms of trade and bargaining 
positions. Consequent to the adoption of a small claims procedure, the WTO dispute settlement 
system would become ‘a rich man’s tool of economic subjugation’.52 As small developing 
countries would avoid using the dispute settlement system, they would no longer be part of the 
process of shaping of trade law or ‘playing for the rules’. Thus, money spent creating a small 
claims procedure would be better used for making improvements to the single WTO dispute 
settlement system. 
Bown and Hoekman identify two different approaches that can be taken when 
attempting to reform the cost of the WTO dispute settlement system. Whilst ‘[o]ne is to reduce 
the cost of litigation through systemic reform[,] [t]he other is to take the system as given and 
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investigate how litigation costs could be lowered for poor countries.’ 53  Like Bown and 
Hoekman, it is argued here that the latter of these approaches is most effective. Integral within 
WTO law is the principle of preferential treatment towards developing countries. The WTO 
dispute settlement system recognises the problems that developing countries and LDCs face in 
engaging with the legal framework. The WTO Agreement contains within it ‘special and 
differential treatment provisions’ which aim to protect the economic interests of developing 
countries as they must be taken into consideration in applying the substantive law. Arguably 
of more importance here is the ‘special and differential treatment’ bestowed on developing 
countries procedurally. The Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) contains articles 
providing developing countries and LDCs with special treatment from the consultation stage 
to the implementation stage. Article 12(10) for example states that ‘…in examining a complaint 
against a developing country Member, the panel shall accord sufficient time for the developing 
country Member to prepare and present its argumentation.’54 Likewise Article 8(10) allows 
developing countries to request at least one panellist from a developing country. These 
provisions support the interests of developing countries by granting them greater time to 
prepare legal cases. As we have seen, developing countries are burdened by the increased 
efforts in discerning legal cases. In this way additional time to prepare should mitigate the 
associated costs. 
In principle the WTO therefore facilitates developing country needs in the dispute 
settlement system. Nevertheless, in reality these provisions may not be practical. As mentioned 
above, the loss of trade during lengthy disputes adversely affects developing countries; time 
delays could therefore worsen this situation. The WTO dispute settlement system had 
attempted to address the issue of delays with its 1966 Decision,55 which allows for accelerated 
consultation and panel procedures when a developing country member brings a complaint 
against a developed country Member.56 Lekgowe argues, however, that its provisions are ‘a 
gust of wind without substance and benefits for developing countries’.57 The fact that the 
accelerated procedure has not been applied suggested that developing countries do prefer more 
time.58 
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Despite the cumbersome cost of litigation, developing countries have methods available 
to them to offset this within the WTO. The most successful of these has been the ACWL. 
Although independent from the WTO, the ACWL works as part of the wider support network 
available to developing country members to reduce costs. The organisation takes a two –tier 
approach to support; providing legal services at reduced fees for developing countries and 
providing sufficient training on WTO law, the latter of which will be discussed later in this 
paper. Even though the ACWL is jointly funded by its 11 developed and 32 developing country 
members, it is the developed countries that provide most of the funding to the ACWL 
Endowment Fund and Working Capital Fund. 59  The ACWL follows WTO principles in 
providing LDCs with preferential treatment as LDCs do not need to contribute to the budget 
and are not required to become members of the ACWL before being able to use its services.60 
The ACWL also provides free legal advice on procedural and substantive issues of WTO law 
for all members up to a certain number of hours.61 Developing countries are banded into three 
categories based on their world trade and per capital income (LDCs constituting a fourth band). 
These bands reflect the hourly rate charged for ACWL support in WTO proceedings applying 
levels of discount progressively.62 The extent of the ACWL’s benefits is shown by the fact that 
legal fees are likely to be discounted by as much as 90 percent for LDCs.63 
As well as providing its own legal services at a reduced fee, the ACWL creates a 
network of private international law firms who also agree to provide external counsel for a 
reduced price.64 By doing so, the ACWL provides expert legal advice to developing countries 
at a fraction of the cost of private law firms. As legal fees are a large proportion of the overall 
costs of WTO litigation, ‘the ACWL lowers the overall costs of the self-enforcement 
process’.65 The consequence of this on developing country participation is that ‘the ACWL 
allows countries to file more sole-complainant disputes on behalf of their exporters’,66 and 
therefore to be proactive. This is demonstrated by the fact that in the 43 WTO cases in which 
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the ACWL has provided assistance to developing countries, those countries have acted in their 
capacity as complaints rather than respondent or third parties.67 
Yet, the ACWL is not without its limits. Although it provides legal advice on WTO law 
and support in WTO proceedings, this is dependent on requests for help by developing 
countries. 68  The ACWL also does not provide developing countries with support at the 
investigatory stage: ‘the ACWL has neither the resources nor the mandate to go out into the 
field and provide information to developing country exporters that they have a legally viable 
case that they could pursue at the WTO to enforce their market access rights.’69 This issue 
reflects the core concern with developing countries’ lack of participation in the WTO dispute 
settlement system, namely governments’ inability to decide when to bring cases to the WTO. 
Since the ACWL does not have economists to provide technical economic consulting 
services, 70  this means that ‘without economic expertise and insight, it can provide no 
information on the size of the economic benefit to pursuing a case.’ 71 This has resulted in the 
same pattern of participation forming in the ACWL that there has been in the WTO dispute 
settlement system. The same few developing countries are taking advantage of the ACWL 
while the majority of developing countries and LDCs remain detached. To date, Thailand 
accounts for 20 percent of the ACWL’s cases and Columbia 12 percent. 72  Subsequently, 
developing countries new to WTO proceedings may lose the chance of ACWL support as the 
centre is only able to support one developing country in cases where two developing countries 
desire its assistance. In this way the ACWL misses its aim of introducing new countries to the 
WTO dispute settlement system.73 
Furthermore, Bown and McCulloch argue that having the ACWL worsens the problem 
of identifying cases to bring to the WTO, ‘to the extent that they discourage private law firms 
from ambulance chasing – ie generating information on behalf of prospective developing-
country clients’.74 Possible reform of the system may therefore lie in the ACWL creating 
greater ties with international private law firms. Working jointly on cases with private law 
firms generates the evidence and expertise needed within countries to identify violations in 
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return for a greater number of prospective developing country clients. A greater number of 
international firms offering pro-bono services would also raise competition and lower overall 
prices. A redirection of funding towards monitoring trade violations in developing countries 
would be beyond the ACWL’s mandate and would result in a loss of essential legal support for 
developing countries. Moreover, funding developing countries directly through the ACWL or 
WTO in order to allow developing countries and LDCs to initiate proceedings would be of less 
value then keeping the money centrally. Splitting the money between numerous developing 
countries means that funds would not go as far. An expansion of funding to the ACWL to do 
so may also be practically difficult as ‘a rich country government may be hesitant to sufficiently 
fund a legal assistance centre that ultimately provides litigation assistance directly challenging 
its own actions.’75 Furthermore, this would create dependence by developing countries on the 
ACWL funding, which cannot be seen as a long term solution. 
Alternatively, a more strategic use of the WTO dispute settlement system by developing 
countries can mean that they avoid the high costs of litigation whilst gaining the experience 
needed. As discussed above, participation in the dispute settlement system is not confined to 
members’ ability to initiate Panel and Appellate Body proceedings. Although Panel and 
Appellate Body proceedings are central to the dispute settlement system, alternative means of 
settlement also exist. Article 25(1) of the DSU states that ‘Expeditious arbitration within the 
WTO as an alternative means of dispute settlement can facilitate the solution of certain disputes 
that concern issues that are clearly defined by both parties.’76 Members also have alternative 
dispute resolution methods available to them in the form of good offices, conciliation or 
mediation, which ‘may be requested at any time by any party to a dispute’.77 In this way, 
members benefit from the fact that they can bring violations to the WTO framework beyond 
litigation. A focus on a diplomatic means of resolution through these provisions means that 
developing countries will not have to bear the high costs associated with litigation. The cost of 
lawyers and a lengthy process are bypassed through direct negotiations. This gives developing 
countries flexibility in how they participate in the dispute settlement system to resolve trade 
violations. 
Nonetheless, what it is more telling about developing countries’ attitudes towards the 
WTO dispute settlement system is the fact that these alternative dispute resolution methods are 
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seldom used – arbitration has only been used once to date.78 Even in that case, arbitration was 
not used as an alternative to Panel proceedings, but instead to support implementation of a 
Panel decision.79 This shows that in actuality a legalistic litigation model is preferred by 
developing countries as they have proven willing to bear the increased costs of Panel and 
Appellate Body proceedings. Although exact reasons for this are not known, this might be 
explained in part by the greater certainty of WTO litigation. 
In addition, a more effective way developing countries have used the dispute settlement 
system is as third parties in consultations and Panel proceedings. The popularity of this 
approach can be seen from the fact that ‘developing countries account for 52% of all third 
parties in the WTO compared with only 36% of complainants.’80 Members with ‘substantial 
interest’ are able to take part in proceedings as third parties.81 They are not simply observing 
but ‘can deliver written and oral testimony during the first round of litigation and therefore will 
receive the first submissions of the complainant(s) and the defendant’.82 In this way, members 
are engaged with the process, able to understand the workings of the legal framework and to 
express their trade interests without bearing the large scale costs. Moreover, acting as a third 
party overcomes the lack of transparency in the WTO dispute settlement system, which acts as 
a hurdle to developing countries accessing the system. Participation in proceedings as a third 
party is a good method in which to gain knowledge and experience in otherwise closed dispute 
settlement proceedings. A frequent user of this approach has been China, who has been party 
to nearly all its disputes since joining the WTO in 2003.83 This offensive approach by China 
has prepared it against future WTO proceedings against it.84 This creates a different narrative 
to the one usually recited of developing countries’ apathetic approach to the WTO dispute  
settlement system. 
Yet, participation in this way is not without its problems. Firstly, third party 
participation can be seen as inferior to proceedings as a complainant or defendant, as ‘[t]hird 
party participation can gain insight, but interests are not protected unless they enter into direct 
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consultations.’85 Participation as third parties also encourages free riding, an occurrence from 
which the WTO dispute settlement system already suffers.86 A country ‘piggybacking’ on 
another member’s filing creates a level of uncertainty as to the extent to which they will benefit 
from another member’s litigation; 87  ‘small countries then become dependent on 
circumstance’.88 This inconsistency means that developing countries are not able to consolidate 
their future bargaining positions. What is more, the data shows that the pattern of third party 
participations follows the patterns of initiation of Panel proceedings, as ‘[s]ome of the most 
frequent third parties … have been Canada, India, Australia, Mexico, Brazil, Korea, Norway, 
Chile, and Switzerland.’89 Third party participation is therefore ‘skewed toward the largest 
trading states’.90 Once again, this shows that the problem of low participation in the dispute 
settlement system lies earlier at the investigation stage. 
A better method of participation by third parties may therefore be developing countries 
initiating joint proceedings. There have been several cases where ‘developed members together 
with developing members have effectively launched joint proceedings’. 91  In EC-Sugar, 92 
Thailand launched proceedings alongside Australia and Brazil against the EU.93 By doing so, 
Thailand avoided bearing the full cost of filing the complaint, splitting the cost of investigations 
with the other members. As investigating and collecting evidence can be the most technically 
daunting and costly part of the dispute settlement process, joint proceedings worked well to 
offset these costs, making the dispute settlement system more accessible. 
However, developing countries face certain economic and political considerations that 
add to the costs of initiating Panel proceedings. An important consideration for developing 
countries initiating WTO dispute settlement proceedings is the possible repercussions of 
litigation on their relationship with trade partners. Developing countries may fear that the cost 
of tainting long-term trade relations with key players is much higher than the uncertain gains 
of market access. Maintaining positive trading relations is a particular desire for smaller 
developing countries that may be reliant on certain trading partners and lack alternative 
exporting markets if relationships sour. Other wider, political reasons besides trade may also 
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make developing countries hesitant to initiate proceedings. Historical allegiances, for example, 
could mean that countries would prefer to maintain positive relationships with other WTO 
members, making them hesitant to initiate or take part in litigation. Shahin argues that Egypt’s 
participation in the WTO dispute settlement system reflects this, as it can be seen to shy away 
from voicing legitimate complaints.94 
Furthermore, developing countries can have a fear of retaliation. Retaliation by 
respondents for initiating litigation within the WTO dispute settlement system could take many 
forms. To begin with developing countries may fear a reciprocation of WTO proceedings 
against them. There is some evidence to support this concern: ‘Reinhardt found that a 
complainant increases the probability of a subsequent case being filed against the complainant 
by up to 55 times’.95 Hence, in order to initiate proceedings, countries must be confident that 
their own trade practices do not violate trade law. Brink notes that South Africa has been a 
hesitant initiator of Panel proceeding as they fear scrutiny reflecting back onto them.96 In this 
way, budgeting for WTO litigation may also require countries to factor in their ability to 
respond to future complaints against them. In this way the dispute settlement system can be 
seen as a ‘double edged sword’. Over the years, China has found itself to be a target of 
developed countries since joining the WTO in 2001,97  being a respondent in 33 cases. 98 
Therefore, when active participation in the WTO dispute settlement system has the potential to 
create enemies, it is sensible for some countries to want to avoid the limelight of litigation. 
In addition, developing countries may fear retaliation beyond the WTO. By initiating 
WTO proceedings against developed countries, developing countries risk losing prior 
privileges, aid and investment on which they have become reliant. This poses a particular 
concern for those LDCs who are the greatest receivers of aid. Factoring this into the dispute 
settlement proceedings shows a skewed balance of power between developed and developing 
countries going into the process. A resistance from developing countries may therefore be a 
case of not wanting to ‘bite the hand that feeds it’. As the WTO does not contain any overt 
code of conduct against such practices and has few safeguards to protect countries from such 
behaviour, there is a lacuna in the law. The WTO does acknowledge these fears in part in its 
‘special and differential provisions’ for developing countries discussed above, but it does not 
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go far enough in actively implementing safeguards for developing countries. In this way a 
stricter code of conduct forced upon developed members may go some way to extinguishing 
these fears. 
However, the strength of the argument that fear of retaliation is a substantial factor in 
developing countries’ lack of participation is largely diminished by reality. Guzman and 
Simmons in their 2005 paper99 looked into this behaviour, which they called ‘power plays’.100 
Their analysis of WTO data found that the hypothesis that poorer countries refrain from filing 
complaints against richer countries due to fear of retaliation did not have any evidential 
support.101 More ostensible evidence against the argument is in the pattern of WTO cases 
themselves. In 1995, Singapore initiated a Panel compliant against its closest neighbour 
Malaysia, ‘despite its then dependence on Malaysia for basic essentials like food and water’.102 
Additionally, the only LDC-initiated case in the WTO has been of Bangladesh’s anti-dumping 
allegations against its neighbouring country and key trade partner India. The argument is 
therefore counter-intuitive in nature as a fear of retaliation from trading partners would make 
any WTO disputes unlikely. On the contrary, ‘[a] mutually high degree of trade dependence is 
likely to contribute to the formation of Panels, as we expected on the basis of the desire to 
establish clear rules that reduce transaction costs’.103 Nonetheless to dismiss the argument 
altogether would be remiss as the weight given to this factor is dependent on individual cases 
and the will of developing country governments. 
These fears of diplomatic break downs may therefore still be a reason why many 
developing countries prefer to settle WTO disputes at the consultation stage. The fact that a 
large amount of disputes are settled before litigation shows that developing country 
engagement with the WTO dispute settlement system may not be as bleak as suggested. 
Consultation as a form of participation in the WTO dispute settlement system generates a 
positive picture as to the strength of the dispute settlement framework. Settlement at the 
consultation stage avoids lengthy and costly litigation. The all-or-nothing character of litigation 
is not always necessary104 where ‘the subject matter of dispute permits greater flexibility (for 
example, tariff rates), the parties can more easily structure appropriate transfer payments 
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through adjustments to the disputed variable’.105 Consultation is more likely to create a win-
win situation that preserves the political sensitivity of trade relations. 
Furthermore, in developing countries where there is a culture of non-litigation, such as 
Thailand and China, the consultation stage provides an amicable setting to resolve disputes.106 
Consultations give members 60 days in which to reach a ‘mutually satisfactory solution’.107 
Within this is also the provision of Article 4(10) DSU that ‘during consultations Members 
should give special attention to the particular problems and interests of developing country 
Members’.108 Although this provision ‘is more declaratory than operative’,109 it does follow 
the general principle within the dispute settlement system of preferential treatment to 
developing and LDC members. 
Busch and Reinhardt argue that the success of the consultations and the WTO dispute 
settlement system in general is because members are bargaining in the shadow of the law. Even 
though the dispute settlement system has been criticised for a lack of enforceability of Panel 
and Appellate Body decisions, this does not hinder the process.110 Instead members bargain in 
the shadow of the law: 
A panel ruling carries weight to the extent that it delivers a timely and coherent 
normative statement on the matter. Even without a credible threat by a complainant to 
seek authorization to retaliate, a definitive legal opinion from the institution may 
empower groups in the defendant state who oppose the measure.111 
Thus, developing countries have stronger bargaining positions within the dispute settlement 
system than they would if they attempted to bargain outside of the WTO. Busch and Reinhardt 
therefore argue that ‘the central problem for developing countries is that they are missing out 
on early settlement, not that they boast a worse record in winning pro-plaintiff rulings’.112 
Consequently, their solution is that developing countries should receive more assistance before 
litigation commences.113 Although this argument coincides with the idea that the model of 
litigation is not the essence of the issue, this paper goes further to suggest that the problem lies 
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even before the consultation stage. The problem is one of capacity issues in investigating and 
monitoring potential trade violations. 
2. Issues of capacity 
The section above shows that while the inherent cost of the WTO dispute settlement system is 
a determining factor for developing country participation, it is not the core of the problem. The 
fact that the WTO system contains numerous ways in which developing countries can reduce 
the cost of participation establishes that the problem lies more with developing countries’ 
capacity to initiate proceedings. Browne takes us to the heart of the matter, that ‘there seems 
to be little in the WTO system per se that needs correcting in this context. It is rather problems 
of internal governance and organization in many capitals that may be responsible for the 
relative absence of many members from the WTO dispute scene’.114 Linked to participation in 
the dispute settlement system is the requirement of members to have the internal capacity to 
bring trade violations to the WTO. Although these capacity issues are individual to countries, 
by comparing the internal capacity of active developing countries with the capacity of those 
developing countries that have low participation rates, areas for reform can be identified. 
The internal capacity needed within members in order to successfully initiate WTO 
dispute settlement proceedings can be seen as a tripartite connection between trade experts, 
government and the private sector.115 Larger developing countries such as Brazil, Argentina 
and China have in recent years built on these three pillars to create strong internal capacity. 
Developing countries that fail to participate fully in the WTO dispute settlement system are 
likely to do so because one or all of these components are weak within the country. What is 
meant by full participation is the ability of member governments to identify trade violations 
and undertake an accurate cost-benefit analysis to bring viable cases to the WTO. 
In order to successfully bring claims to the WTO dispute settlement system, developing 
countries must begin with building internal trade expertise. The primary way to gain internal 
trade expertise is through maintaining home-grown talent. To begin with, incorporating trade 
and trade-related issues into the education system will create a pool of trade experts from which 
the country will benefit.116 For example, the introduction of higher education courses in trade 
at universities will encourage a new generation of students and lawyers interested in 
specialising within this area.117 Brazil has done this by creating a ‘[s]mall Brazilian epistemic 
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community specialising in trade matters’,118 where scholars, practitioners and trade associates 
gather in order to establish progress and debate.119 Alongside education, developing countries 
need to do more to retain talent and expertise within the country. It is of little surprise that trade 
lawyers and experts in WTO law mostly reside within the US and EU where there are greater 
educational and job opportunities.120 Therefore a common problem that developing countries 
face is ‘[t]he loss of the few knowledgeable people’.121 Accordingly, in order to maintain 
expertise within the country, governments need to ensure that education in trade issues is 
followed with practical job opportunities in order to avoid expertise leaving the country. 
Linked to this is the second pillar to building strong internal capacity, which is 
developing governments having a clear and sufficiently resourced trade agenda. As discussed 
in the first section of this paper, engagement with the WTO dispute settlement system is 
paramount for governments to effectively pursue their trade interests. One way to ensure that 
there is a focus on trade policy in developing countries is by creating specialised trade 
departments in government.122 These departments need to be funded centrally and have the 
authority to pursue trade policy. The problem for developing countries and LDCs is their 
greater limitation on resources and money. Small government budgets that must be distributed 
across all social welfare needs (eg healthcare, education and infrastructure) mean that trade is 
not necessarily a priority for government spending. Moreover, in small countries where their 
volume of world trade is low, the opportunity cost of spending money on trade may not be seen 
to be worth the minimal returns in market access. Placing long-term funding into trade 
departments when WTO cases remain few and far between could be considered a waste. 
Therefore, what is essential is the will of governments to recognise the benefits of investment 
in trade issues, in terms of its positive effect on specific economic outcomes, trade terms and 
future bargaining positions. 
Finally, vital to the tripartite model of internal trade capacity is the engagement of the 
private sector. As many of the violations of trade originate in the private sector, it is essential 
that the private sector engages with central government departments in order to identify and 
progress viable WTO cases. A developing country’s exporters are best placed to be able to 
monitor and identify when trade violations take place. Their direct financial interest means that 
they will be motivated to monitor markets. Their understanding of international markets and 
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industry competition is therefore essential for generating strong cases of violations to bring to 
the WTO disputes settlement system. In this way it is essential that there is an ease of 
engagement between the private sector and government to facilitate the frequent sharing of 
information. Thus, when all three communities of the tripartite system work effectively 
together accurate cost-benefit analysis can be conducted by developing countries, resulting in 
worthwhile cases being brought to the WTO dispute settlement system. 
With the intention of solving some of the capacity issues above, the ACWL provide 
developing countries with tools to build their legal capacity in trade. As discussed earlier, the 
ACWL implements a two-tier approach supporting developing countries and LDCs in WTO 
proceedings. Whilst the first deals with reducing fees, the second tier deals with building 
capacity, recognising that ‘[a] WTO member can seize these opportunities only if it 
understands its rights and obligations as a WTO member and if it understands how the WTO 
conducts negotiations, takes decisions and settles disputes’.123 The ACWL offers developing 
countries and LDCs training in WTO law through annual courses, seminars and training 
sessions. 124  The ACWL works directly with government trade lawyers in order to build 
expertise within developing countries. Its Secondment Programme for Trade Lawyers offers a 
nine month paid internship in which those lawyers are trained by ACWL lawyers. It is hoped 
that those government lawyers will be able to bring expertise back to their countries and 
incorporate their knowledge into the government infrastructure. Likewise, ACWL seminars 
and courses provide information on substantive and procedural elements of the WTO, keeping 
countries up to date on contemporary trade issues.125 The WTO itself also offers developing 
countries additional resources and training on dispute settlement. Its own internship 
programme,126 one-week Dispute Settlement Course,127 and teach-yourself videos128 found on 
its website are easily accessible to all members requiring information on WTO law. In doing 
so, the ACWL and WTO mitigate basic capacity issues found in developing countries, although 
other challenges remain. 
Some of the primary barriers for developing countries and LDCs in bringing 
proceedings into the WTO are cultural differences. In particular for non-western countries, 
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language barriers exist between national languages and the WTO dispute settlement system, 
making it more difficult for internal experts to interpret legal documents and respond to 
complaints. Whereas most WTO cases are published in English, French, and Spanish, countries 
not well-versed in these languages – typically Southeast Asian and African members – are 
disadvantaged in their ability to quickly and accurately understand the WTO jurisprudence.129 
In addition the WTO judicial framework is less familiar to countries that lack a common law 
experience.130 These developing countries can thus benefit from the additional training and 
support offered by the ACWL and WTO so as to engage effectively with the system. 
Yet, while the ACWL and WTO help developing countries build basic capacity, they 
are limited in their ability to resolve deep-seated gaps. The nature of WTO and ACWL 
internships and courses is that they are on the whole conducted ‘on the premises’.131 This 
requires developing governments to fund their trade lawyers’ travel and stay in Geneva, yet 
many developing countries cannot afford to do so due to the costs and existing problems of 
short-staffed departments. The availability of online resources and training materials has gone 
some way in tackling this weakness of WTO and ACWL training, but more can be done on a 
regional level to make training more accessible to developing countries. Mosoti highlights how 
‘African countries have already come up with modalities on how to optimally utilise their 
scarce human resource potential’,132 by having the African member representatives in Geneva 
brief each other on focal points for Doha negotiations.133 Following this initiative, developing 
countries could create a similar scheme for WTO dispute settlement. Regional conferences on 
the dispute settlement system where experts can share their knowledge would expand 
awareness in low participating regions. Taking this approach further, Mosoti suggests 
establishing regional advisory centres on WTO law as an effective solution to create long-term 
capacity at a low cost.134 Although such a reform would be effective in strengthening the two 
components of trade expertise and government capacity within the tripartite model, building 
engagement of the private sector with government trade departments is best achieved internally 
by developing countries’ governments. 
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E. DRIVING INTERNAL CAPACITY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
The sections above have shown that the core of the problem of developing countries’ 
participation lies with identifying WTO violations and the ability of government to accurately 
assess the viability of bringing these cases into the dispute settlement system. From the 
evidence, this can be narrowed further into an internal capacity problem within developing 
countries regarding a lack of convergence between the private sector and government. In this 
way, as the problem is mostly internal within countries, much of the reform must also be 
initiated internally. 
In their 2010 study, Bown and McCulloch found that the ‘observability’ of violations 
is a key factor in the type of measures brought by both developing and developed countries to 
the WTO. 135  They found that developing countries that initiated WTO proceedings as 
complainants did so mostly for cases of antidumping and countervailing, as these violations 
are the most obvious for members to identify.136 In contrast, ‘the EC and the US dominate 
disputes initiated over low observability measures, and such complaints are much less 
frequently initiated by developing countries’.137 It is strongly suggested by the evidence that 
developing countries lack the capacity to identify less obvious trade violations. This hinders 
the frequency of developing countries’ potential engagement with the dispute settlement 
system. 
Unlike what has often been the case for developing countries, strengthening 
observability of trade violations must come from active reform by governments and cannot be 
left to circumstance. It can be seen that, in Argentina for instance, ‘the requirement to defend 
against cases triggered a governmental capacity building process of human resources devoted 
to WTO’.138 Similarly, Brazil’s participation in early WTO cases had a catalysing effect on the 
government’s commitment to building internal capacity, stimulating competition for trade-
related expertise within the country.139 Therefore, these developing countries can be seen to 
have built capacity not through active mandate but a result of circumstance. Although 
participation as respondents in the WTO dispute settlement system had unintended positive 
affects for these countries, the sustainability of trade capacity is reliant on government’s 
proactive reforms. These two case studies do however show how external sources, such as 
increased media coverage on WTO disputes, can also help raise awareness and debate on trade 
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policy.140 While recognising that capacity building is partly a natural process, this does not 
mean that the only incentive to build trade capacity must be from necessity. A more considered 
long-term plan would serve developing countries better. 
It is argued here that as the private sector is best placed to monitor and investigate WTO 
violations, engagement between the private sector and central government is vital. The problem 
of low developing country participation arises because this relationship between the private 
sector and government is weak. Private industry is the initial driving force for trade violations 
reaching the dispute settlement stage, as it is that pressure and information that gives 
governments the will to pursue viable cases. Thus, if the private sector is unaware that its rights 
are being violated in the first place, then it will be unable to escalate concerns to its government. 
Additionally, if the private sector does not have a clear platform through which to access the 
government, then again there are obstacles to bringing violations to the WTO. In this way a 
lack of knowledge in the private sector and lack of access to government would need to be 
addressed. 
Firstly, in circumstances where the private sector is active in investigating trade 
violations, Bown and Hoekman suggest that the ‘public-private model requires a public sector 
counterpart that has the mandate and competence – both legally and administratively – to 
pursue the interests of the private sector’.141 As we have seen from the present low participation 
rates in developing countries, ‘leaving its supply to market forces alone will likely lead to 
under-provision for standard economic reasons’.142 It is therefore essential that governments 
are able to respond to private sector calls for progression of cases to the WTO dispute 
settlement system. If governments do not have the resources or expertise, they will miss 
opportunities to bring legitimate concerns to trade partners. A lack of action by governments 
on repeated occasions can consequently cause antipathy in the private sector. Developing 
countries must therefore invest in having an accessible way in which the private sector can 
escalate concerns and receive efficient responses. Some ways in which this can be achieved are 
through specialised central government departments, an Ombudsman, 143  or research 
committees. 
Secondly, where the issues are a lack of will in government and a lack of knowledge of 
rights in the private sector, the formation of trade associations can help.144 As seen within larger 
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developing countries, the establishment of strong trade associations has increased the 
monitoring of trade and reduced the overall cost of monitoring for individual companies by 
encouraging a sharing of industry trends and resources.145 More importantly, the result of trade 
associations is a greater political voice with which industries can approach government. It is 
not surprising that those sectors with powerful lobbies (such as clothing and agriculture) are 
most successful in approaching government with their concerns.146 Both the private sector and 
government benefit from industries having a strong political voice. The private sector creates 
accountability within government, providing a check on trade policy to ensure that 
governments are not idle. In addition to this government benefits from the fact that the private 
sector takes on the costs of investigating and evidence finding for potential WTO cases. It is 
also argued that the private sector is best placed to absorb these costs as loss of market access 
hurts their financial interests. 
Superficially there is reason to think that an independent prosecutor in the WTO may 
be a positive reform. However, looking into the viability of the approach shows that it is fraught 
with obstacles. The suggestion that the WTO dispute settlement system should have an 
independent prosecutor is based on the idea that this prosecutor would be better able to 
undertake the investigation and fact-finding role that developing countries are weak in 
performing. This would mean that developing countries with little internal capacity to support 
investigations would be able to bring cases to the WTO dispute settlement system. Yet looking 
broadly at other international organisations that have used this approach shows that there are 
many problems in having an independent prosecutor. A clear example is the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), which is headed by an independent prosecutor from member states on a 
rotating basis. The ICC in recent years can be seen to be struggling with the lack of resources 
and political will to manage its growing caseloads. Moreover, the role of prosecutor has 
become highly political, hindering the prosecutor’s ability to bring the accused to court. For 
this reason the WTO is better off remaining a self-representative system that is member-driven 
and adheres to a rule of law. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that developing countries must solely carry the cost 
of reform. Like the ACWL, NGOs could provide developing countries with the ability to build 
internal capacity. Bown and Hoekman show that large NGOs with a local presence are able to 
identify whether the local business interests in market access are worth taking to the WTO 
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dispute settlement system. ‘Thus, local NGO offices or entities could help mobilize the public-
private partnership required to use the DSU most effectively by helping to identify cases that 
could be brought to domestic government officials with evidence that they are worthy of pursuit 
at the WTO’.147 In this way, NGOs can help raise the private sector’s awareness of their rights 
under WTO law and assist in the monitoring of trade violations. NGOs (such as International 
Lawyers and Economists Against Poverty) that provide trade-related technical assistance to 
developing countries would be able to help governments in their cost-benefit analysis. 148 
Although developing countries are generally hesitant regarding NGO participation in the 
WTO,149 opening themselves up to such provisions could help them fill the current gap between 
private sector and central government engagement. 
 
F. CONCLUSION 
This paper aimed to undertake a comprehensive discussion of the reasons for the low level of 
developing country participation in the WTO dispute settlement system. It is argued here that 
the approach that developing countries should take to the question of participation is ultimately 
a cost-benefit analysis. The first section of the paper shows that in considering the benefits to 
participation, developing countries are aware of the economic stakes, but largely underestimate 
the wider strategic importance of participation. Moreover, in identifying the reasons why 
developing countries fail to participate, although the cost issues of the dispute settlement 
system are frequently acknowledged as the primary obstacle for developing countries, these 
costs are overstated. The trends in actual participation show that developing countries can use 
the system in shrewd ways that reduce the inherent costs of the WTO litigation procedure. 
What is most important is that developing countries must be more willing to capitalise on the 
support available within the WTO and outside of it in order to offset cost and capacity issues. 
Therefore the question posed in this paper is not of whether developing countries can afford to 
participate, but whether they have the capacity to do so. In answer to this latter question, it is 
found that smaller developing countries do not. Developing countries and LDCs are able to 
litigate within the WTO dispute settlement system, but at the outset lack the ability to make 
accurate decisions as to the viability of bringing trade violations to the WTO. As this decision 
is reliant on technical knowledge and legal expertise, a common weakness among small 
developing countries is with the engagement of the private sector with government. As this 
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capacity issue is distinctly internal, external organisation such as the WTO and ACWL are 
limited in the support they can provide. More so, the WTO cannot be expected to do much 
more than it already does. Instead, increased governmental awareness of trade rights in the 
private sector would provide a more organic solution.
